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A b stract
This paper presents a model of a developing economy with three sectors— 
industry, agriculture, and energy. Industry and energy are assumed to be demand- 
constrained, but agriculture supply-constrained. The model highlights (a) struc­
tural transformation, through labor transfer from agriculture to industry, (b) 
inflation, driven by the interaction of demand and the supply constraint in agri­
culture, and (c) the link between energy use and labor productivity. Employ­
ing a Kaldor Verdoorn productivity rule in industry augmented with energy 
intensity— energy per unit of labor— as an argument, we emphasize that labor 
productivity growth is driven by energy intensity rather than energy productivity 
growth. As a consequence, emissions reduction without North-South technology 
transfer and financial assistance costs growth.
1 Introduction
The defining characteristic of many developing countries is structural heterogeneity— 
the existence of modern production activities side by side with informal, traditional 
activities (Prebisch (1959); Polanyi Levitt (2005)). The fundamental policy challenge 
for developing countries is to  provide productive employment opportunities for often 
still fast growing populations and to  raise labor productivity. If G D P growth is strong  
enough, transfer of labor from low productivity to high productivity activities can  
support a virtuous circle of development and growth (Kaldor (1978); Ocam po (2005)). 
Generating employment in high productivity activities is difficult enough. It can be
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further com plicated for several reasons, some of which have been raised for decades in 
the field of development economics.
A surge in labor productivity in industry can reduce demand for labor, and hence 
increase the share of workers in informal activities (R ad a (2010)). Strong demand, 
on the other hand, leads to productivity growth with labor transfer. B u t growth of 
industrial employment, rural-urb an m igration and other global factors can lead to  up­
ward pressure on agricultural prices (Lewis (1954); Harris and Todaro (1970); Kalecki 
(1976)). The resulting decrease in real wages in term s of necessary agricultural goods 
can choke off an expansion, especially when external demand is weak or export capac­
ities are underdeveloped (Taylor (1983)).
These issues have regained prominence in the ongoing debate on m acroeconom ic 
development policies. Despite strong growth performances, several so-called success 
stories show mixed employment pictures. China and India are only the two largest 
developing countries where jobless growth appears to  have taken hold. In both coun­
tries, the share of informal sector employment in to tal employment is rising. High 
com m odity prices, and specifically high prices of food and staples continue to  threaten  
livelihoods and depress real incomes in the Global South, even if they have receded 
from their highs in the developed world.
Further, increasing the supply of energy and related infrastructure is of crucial 
im portance for development prospects, but the technological, knowledge-related and 
cost impediments to  quickly adopt high productivity designs are often considerable. 
High emission energy provision is then the only feasible option, and the development 
process will be accom panied by a rise in (fossil) energy per unit of labor (O cam po et al. 
(2009)).
Growth of labor productivity can ex-post be decomposed into growth of energy 
productivity (G D P per unit of energy), and growth of energy intensity (energy per 
unit of labor)— and the latter has historically dominated the former (Taylor (2008)). 
The more heavily growth depends on rising energy intensity— as opposed to  energy 
productivity— the more harmful emissions it creates. The increase in energy intensity 
stem s, simply, from mechanization. The use of machinery requires more energy; the  
use of machinery increases labor productivity. The challenge clim ate change poses is 
to  render future labor productivity increases rather the result of energy productivity  
increases.
In this paper, we illustrate the uphill battle especially a developing economy faces 
in th at undertaking. Using the example of Egypt, we show first th at past labor pro­
ductivity growth has relied on energy intensity growth rather than energy productivity  
growth. Second, employing a structuralist m ulti-sectoral model of development with 
a focus on labor transfer and energy-productivity links, we show th at it is likely th at 
future (medium run) productivity growth will show the same p attern .1 Slower (or even
1 Economic models of climate change commonly are intertemporal full employment models of the 
long run a la Ramsey. Stern (2007) and Nordhaus (2008) are two important references. See Rezai 
et al. (2009) for a careful approach to this type of modeling. We are taking a different approach here; 
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negative) growth of emissions would be possible only with either a halt to  development, 
or with changes in technology.
We begin below with the discussion of empirical evidence on the relationship be­
tween rising energy intensity and rising labor productivity. In th at section, we will as 
well review statistics on economic performance and structural change in Egypt. Sec­
tion 3 presents the model. It includes an introductory sum m ary; the remainder of the  
section might be skipped by the less technically inclined reader. Section 4 presents 
simulation results and analysis. Section 5 concludes.
2 Structural change and energy demand in Egypt
Sustained economic growth per cap ita  is a fairly recent phenomenon. Over the last, 
say, two hundred and fifty years, the combined forces of fossil energy production and 
m anufacturing have lead to  manifold increases in living standards in large p arts of the  
world. Here, we review this through the lens of the past few decades in Egypt.
First, we show th at Egypt has not experienced a successful transition towards m an­
ufacturing. Instead, the country has relied on low productivity employment in agri­
culture and services to absorb the labor force. Policy should aim to trigger a virtuous 
circle of dynamic structural change, which could sustain growth of labor productivity  
and living standards. However, second, th at would require energy intensification and 
the accom panying fossil emissions. Indeed, we show th at labor productivity growth 
in Egypt since 1970 was driven by energy intensity growth, not energy productivity  
growth. Based on these observations, we m otivate an augmented K aldor-V erdoorn  
productivity rule, which takes energy intensity, besides demand, as an argument.
Development and growth require structural transform ation towards high produc­
tivity, high value added activities. M anufacturing, the most energy intensive sector, 
has the highest potential to  deliver increasing returns to scale and overall productivity  
growth through spillovers and dynam ic linkages. Especially agricultural activities are 
often subject to decreasing returns and therefore can present a drag on productivity  
growth and growth in general. Still, industrialization and structural transform ation is 
impossible without an expansion of output and productivity in the agricultural sector. 
Provision of affordable foodstuffs is crucial to alleviate poverty. Further, inflation of 
food prices has negative effects on external competitiveness.
[F ig u r e  1—4  a b o u t  h e re ]
A decomposition of G D P growth by sectors reveals th at m anufacturing and agri­
culture’s contribution to  growth has stagnated in recent decades. See Figure l .2 The
2Aggregate value added is calculated by summing value added across sectors, X  =  • Total
differentiation of this expression with respect to time allows us to write the growth rate of value 
added as a weighted average of sectoral growth rates in value-added, X — Y^ i=\ V%Xj. where 6i is each 
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service sector’s contribution to  growth, on the other hand, has declined between the  
1980s and 2000s despite the rise in the sector’s weight in the overall economy. See Fig­
ure 2 . Slow growth of labor productivity in services is one reason. T h at jobs in services 
tend to be low productivity and possibly informal is another. Since the 1970s overall 
economic growth has as well benefited significantly less from mining activities. The  
cause has to  be seen in large fluctuations of oil prices, as documented by, for example, 
U N D P (2009). Overall, these numbers add to a pronounced slowdown in growth in the  
past two decades. Figures 3 and 4 further add to this picture. The services share of 
to tal employment has risen over the period considered. W hile the employment share 
of agriculture is falling, the employment share of industry is stagnant. Labor produc­
tivity, on the other hand, rose most strongly in industry, and more m oderately at lower 
levels in services and agriculture.
Clearly, Egypt would— as would many other developing countries— benefit from a 
shift towards m anufacturing and related activities, provided growth is strong enough 
to  avoid labor shedding. To sustain growth and increased living standards, the share 
of industry in output and employment must rise.
Let us now consider the link of such growth and industrialization to  energy demand. 
Reliable d ata  on energy demand is available only for the period after W orld W ar II. 
Nevertheless, we can get an idea about its association with economic performance. 
Figures 5 through 7 show d ata  on annual growth rates of labor productivity, energy 
productivity and energy intensity in Egypt. The straight lines are simple OLS regres­
sions. Figure 5 shows the relationship between labor productivity growth and growth 
of energy intensity, or the ratio  of energy per unit of labor. The slope coefficient is 
0.18, meaning th at an increase of energy intensity growth of one percent coincides with 
an increase in the growth rate  of labor productivity of roughly one fifth of one p ercent.3
[F ig u r e s  5 —7  a b o u t  h ere ]
Figure 6 , in turn, suggests th at there is no such correlation between growth of en­
ergy productivity and growth of labor productivity in Egypt. Further, since the sum of 
energy productivity growth and energy intensity growth is equal to labor productivity  
growth, there exists a direct trade-off between these two. Figure 7 shows th at rela­
tionship: For a given level of labor productivity, an increase in energy intensity growth 
correlates (roughly) o n e-to -o n e with a decrease in energy productivity growth. These 
results are disheartening. The implication is th at labor productivity growth rises with 
energy intensity at the expense of energy productivity. In other words, higher fossil 
emissions per worker are indeed a negative externality of economic growth. P ast— and 
insufficient— structural change has been accom panied by energy intensification. W ith  
a given technology, emission reductions must cost growth.
Based on these observations, we now m otivate an augmented K aldor-V erdoorn
3 The slope of this regression for average growth rates of more than sixty developing countries 
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relationship, in which we include the positive relationship between labor productivity  
and energy. W e begin the exposition here with the aforementioned accounting identity, 
and then move on to the behavioral function. F irst, some notation. Let Y  be real GDP, 
L a suitable index of to tal employment, and J a suitable index of aggregate energy 
use. Further, define labor productivity as — energy productivity as O  — 7 , and 
energy intensity as e =  jr. Obviously, ^  =  £je, and log-differentiation gives
growth of labor productivity is ex-post identically equal to the sum of the growth rates  
of energy productivity and energy intensity. A rise in energy productivity means th at 
the same amount of energy produces now a larger quantity of output. A decline in 
energy intensity implies th at the average worker produces the same amount of output 
but uses less energy than before.
As put before, the challenge clim ate change poses is to rely on energy productivity  
growth rather than energy intensity growth e to  drive increases in living standards. 
This needs to be qualified. F irst, these two ratios can improve, i.e. >  0 and e <  0 
even if the absolute am ount of energy use J rises. Clearly, in such a case harmful 
emissions increase— only in relative term s, emissions decrease. Second, employing re­
newable energy technology relaxes the constraint; green energy intensification is not the  
problem. However, the problem is th at most developing countries are likely constrained  
in the implementation of knowledge-intensive green energy sources. Even China, with 
ample resources at hand and a fast growing market share in wind energy technology, 
continues to rely heavily on fossil energy sources for growth.
Indeed, with a given technology, as defined by fixed input-output coefficients, the  
model is best interpreted to  describe the medium run— a period anywhere between 
five and fifteen years. Accordingly, we assume th at renewable energy blueprints are 
not readily available or implementable, and focus on fossil, em issions-heavy sources of 
energy. We will return to  this issue in the concluding discussion.
W h at does equation (2 .1) mean for our model? Em pirical evidence outlined above 
suggests th at increases in energy intensity m atter for labor productivity, so th at we 
include e as an explanatory variable. On the contrary, however, there appears to be 
no positive link between energy productivity and labor productivity. (Additionally, as 
discussed below in more detail, the fixed proportions technology implies th at energy 
productivity is constant, except when trade effects exist.) Hence, we do not include £j  
as an argum ent in the productivity rule. The standard Kaldor Verdoorn rule deter­
mines labor productivity, of course, as a function of demand.
Accordingly, the equation for the level of labor productivity in industry can be 
w ritten as
Cl — +  e, (2 .1)
where a ”h at” over a variable indicates the growth rate  of said variable. In words,
(2 .2)
where the sub-index 1  denotes the sector, (5° is a param eter and (51 and 52 are the  
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W h at, in turn, does the behavioral function (2 .2 ) mean for our model? Since 
e =  J — L, L =  Y  — £l , and =  5lY  +  626 (with <5° =  0 for brevity), growth of energy 
intensity can be w ritten as
If the economy is closed to trade, or insensitive to external price changes, the G D P -  
to -o u tp u t ratio will be constant. It follows th at J =  Y , and equation (2 .3) becomes
8 XY
(2 .4)
1 -  82 '
which, with 0 <  c)1, S2 <  1, implies th at G D P growth necessitates energy intensification.
3 The model
This section presents the model. In two following subsections, we discuss the equations 
in detail. Let us begin here with a sum m ary of key features, and a brief overview of 
the Social Accounting M atrix (SAM ).
The model disaggregates the Egyptian economy into three sectors: (1) industry and 
services, (2) agriculture and (3) energy. The sectors are indexed 1, 2 and 3, respectively. 
For brevity, we will m ostly refer to industry and services simply as industry. Agricul­
ture includes all agricultural and husbandry activities except food processing, which is 
here considered part of industry. The energy sectors includes petroleum -related and 
electricity producing activities.
Table 1 shows the SA M .4 The SAM conforms to  standard bookkeeping rules. Rows 
summarize incomes, columns expenditures, and row and column sums are equal. The  
first three rows show to tal sales of the three sectors, the first three columns their 
costs— intermediates, factor costs, production taxes (net of subsidies), and im ports.
Columns four through six summarize consumption and saving behavior of three 
households: a worker household W , reveicing wages from sectors 1 and 2, a capitalist 
household C, receiving profits from sectors 1  and 2 , and an agricultural household 
A, recieving income from sector 2 . Government, foreign and capital account present 
further sources of final demand, financed by the respective incomes.
4Our Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) is an aggregation of the SAM presented in El-Said et al. 
(2001), which has a base year of 1996/7. To construct the SAM El-Said et al. (2001) use data from 
Egypt’s national accounts, government and trade accounts, an official SAM for 1991/2 as well as 
household data from the Egypt Integrated Household Survey conducted by International Food Policy 
Research Institute in 1996/7. We make some simplifying assumptions, explained as we go through 
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[T a b le s  1 a n d  2 a b o u t  h ere ]
Crucially, industry and services are structurally similar to  industry and services in 
advanced economies. Large firms with significant market shares produce with excess 
capacity, enjoy pricing power, and satisfy current demand by varying their rates of uti­
lization. Higher rates of utilization necessitate hiring. The growth rate  of employment, 
however, is smaller than  the growth rate  of value added; in the short run due to  labor 
hoarding, and in the medium run due to Kaldor Verdoorn effects. Along these well- 
known lines, labor productivity growth increases with output growth. As discussed in 
detail above, we add energy intensity as an argum ent in the labor productivity rule.
Agriculture is fundamentally different. W ith  a given technology and limited fertile 
land, output is pre determined, and does not vary with changing levels of labor supply. 
However, labor productivity is endogenous, since a demand expansion in, say, industry  
leads to hiring there, and a reduction of surplus labor here. Further, given agricultural 
output, its price ensures th at sectoral excess demand is zero.
Energy provision is modeled principally like industry. We assume for simplicity 
th at there are no investment or public expenditures on energy. Otherwise, the sector’s 
firms are assumed to be large, have significant market share, excess capacity and pricing 
power; hence, quantity-clearing. This structure is reasonable in the short and medium  
run. Conventional fossil-based energy provision might well be supply-constrained and 
price clearing, but we will leave th at topic for future inquiry and focus for now on the  
medium run linkages between industrialization, food prices, and energy demand.
In the following subsections, we set out the equations. Further below, we discuss 
the m odel’s properties in detail.
3.1 Output and employment
Having broadly laid out the m odel’s structure, we can proceed to  present details. Let 
us begin with determ ination of outputs. In industry, real output X\ is the sum of 
interm ediate demands, consumption C i, investment / i ,  government expenditures G\ 
and exports E\\
3
X i — ^   ^cinXi +  C\ +  G\ +  I\ +  E\. (3 .1)
i
Total consumption of the sector’s product decomposes by sources of demand, C\ =
+  Oj4, where subscripts denote the type of product, and (capitalized) superscripts 
the origin of demand for th at product. Note the aggregation scheme: V7-households 
earn (a fte r-ta x ) wage income from industry and energy, and consume all of it; A  
households earn (a fte r-ta x ) wage income from agriculture and consume all of it; C -  
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Analogous to  equation (3 .1 ), energy sector output is dem and-determ ined,
3
X 3 =  Y j ^ X ,  +  C ^  +  E3, (3 .2)
i
with the difference th at A households do not consume (significant am ounts of) energy, 
so th at = 0 .  In contrast to  industry and energy, the level of agricultural output is 
capacity-constrained, and just proportional to inherited capital:
X% =  7 ^ 2  =  X 2. (3 .3)
Value added in the three sectors is proportional to  real outputs. We can write the  
share of domestic value added in supply as
l i j  =  —r- =  1 -  ( ^ 2  a ij +  t f  +  f j e )  ^ (3 -4 )
where t f  is a production ta x  net of subsidies, f j  =  Mj/Xj  is the sectoral im port 
propensity and e is the nominal exchange rate, quoted as the domestic currency price 
of a unit of foreign currency. It should be emphasized th at f.ij is not an accounting but a 
behavioral relationship.5 It m irrors the Leontief production structure for intermediate 
im ports. Crucially, the ratio varies only with the nominal exchange rate  e and f j , if 
the latter is responsive to  relative price changes.
Indeed, export and im port demand can be responsive to price changes; in standard  
fashion export and im port functions are
Mj =  ^ p J ^ X j  (3 .5)J r J
Ej =  X°P}’ XJ,  (3 .6)
where eP* the foreign price in domestic currency, Pj the domestic goods price, and
eP* f
Pj — -s2- the sector’s relative price. X -  represents world demand for 7-se cto r product. 
As discussed below, price elasticities of im port demand (pj and export demand Xj can  
vary substantially across sectors.
Investment and government expenditures on industry output are exogenous. Con­
sumption is determined by a standard Linear Expenditure System  (L E S ). See the  
appendix for the equations. We should note here th at fixed real agricultural output 
implies th at consumption demand for agricultural product from A -households is fixed, 
as well. It follows th at a rise of interm ediate demand for agricultural product can be sat­
isfied only if modern households shift away from consumption of food, after minimum
5The degree of freedom accorded by the cost decomposition along each sector’s column is used for 
the determination of the output price. The real ratio /i:/ must therefore differ from that accounting 
relationship. An often used alternative to this specification is an ’’Armington” CES aggregate, from 
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’’floor” consumption. (High levels of floor consumption can significantly constrain the  
system , as it might prohibit th at from happening.) Profit income is the sum of profits 
generated in sectors 1 and 3, and their savings— the sole source of private savings— is 
equal to  a constant fraction of Y c . Profit income is taxed  at the rates t f  and in 
the two sectors, respectively.
Finally, let us consider the labor m arket. Em ploym ent in industry and energy rises 
with demand. As rates of capacity  utilization increase, labor demand increases. We 
define the following relationship
Li =  j -  (3 .7)
S i
for i =  1 ,3 , where £* is sectoral labor productivity— assumed constant for the energy 
providing sector, but endogenous and pro-cyclical in industry. (See section 2, and 
specifically equation (2 .2) for details on the determ ination of labor productivity in 
industry.) The agricultural sector 2, however, must absorb all surplus labor:
L2 — L — Li — L 3 , (3-8)
where L is the constant labor force. An im portant implication is th at there is no 
unemployment, but only disguised wn<ieremployment in the agricultural sector.
3.2 Prices and distribution
The model features three sectoral output prices (P i, P 2, P3), three sectoral value added 
prices (Z i ,Z 2,Z 3), three nominal wage rates ( t o i j ^ , ^ ) ,  and a set of two profit rates  
(?’i ,? ’3) and two corresponding sectoral profit shares
Let us begin with output prices in sector 1 and 3. Prices are cost determined. 
Defining vt =  1 — avl — t f ,  we can write the output price as a weighted average of 
all cost com ponents— domestic intermediates, the factor cost index Z  and im ported  
inputs:
Pi =  Y  — p i +  ~ z i +  ~ eP i • (3-9)
1'i 1'i 1'i
The corresponding value added prices for i — 1 ,3  are
=  r h j - '  (3 -10)1 TT't si
where Wi/ i^ are sectoral nominal unit labor costs and 1 /(1  — 7r.;) =  1 +  r* are sectoral 
m ark-up factors.
The price of agricultural output responds to  excess demand. Since X 2 is exogenous, 
clears excess demand in the sector, and thus is proportional to
3
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whereas the net price Z 2 clears the cost decomposition, and can be w ritten as
z  =  ( 1 - 0 , _  y >  ^
,l2
Further, in agriculture, the nominal wage varies to clear the income value added iden­
tity, so th at
ZoYo
w2 =  - p  =  F 2? 2, (3 .13)
-^ 2
which of course implies th at the real agricultural wage grows at the rate  of labor 
productivity growth in the sector. In summary, P 2 responds to  demand; responds 
net income per unit, in other words, to  the excess of P 2 over costs; and w2 responds to  
Z 2 and labor productivity.
Nominal wages in industry and energy are exogenous, but profit rates vary with the  
distribution of income and economic activity. The two sectoral profit rates are allowed 
to  differ. Because sector 3 uses accum ulated industrial output as capital, the rate  of 
profit must be adjusted for the relative price. From  the definition of the capital share, 
the profit rates can then be w ritten as
ri =  7i\ a n d  (3.14)
Z 3Y3 , .
rs =  <3 -15> 
The m ark-up rates T\ and 73 are exogenous, implying th at the distribution of factor 
income in these two sectors is exogenous.
Lastly, we have to aggregate. The overall profit share 7r is just to tal profit income 
as a share of aggregate GDP, PyY . The G D P deflator Py is calculated as a F ish er-  
index of the three sectoral prices.6 The real exchange rate  index p is the ratio  of the  
(im port-)w eighted average of im port prices in domestic currency to  Py.
4 Simulation results and sensitivity analysis
In this section, we discuss simulation results. Three scenarios are considered. F irst, 
investment demand expansion in the industry represents a demand shock. A wage 
increase in the same sector represents a dom estic price shock; a nominal depreciation  
an external price shock. To investigate sensitivity of model results with respect to  key 
param eters, we consider three different calibrations for full model results (Table 3), 
and conduct more comprehensive sensitivity analysis for selected variables (Figures 8 
and 9). W e focus on trade price elasticities and the productivity rule in sector 1.
6The Fisher-index is the square root of the product of Laspeyres and Paasche indexes, with base 
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Before delving into the numbers, let us briefly consider a baseline calibration. Note 
th at we do not claim th at this is the ’’right” calibration, but only th at it might be 
reasonable. Full econom etric param eterization of the model could shed light on the  
issue. Here, we rather want to  focus on the relationship between the model structure  
and energy use; as will be seen, the results are to  a large extent independent from any 
specific calibration applied.
First, we assume th at im ports in the agricultural sector do not respond to  real 
exchange rate  changes, meaning </>2 =  0. W ith  E g y p t’s reliance on food im ports in 
mind, this seems not to be an overly restrictive assumption. Price elasticities of im port 
and export demand for industry output are more responsive to  price changes; | — (f)\ | =  
Xi =  0.75. The im port and export price elasticity of energy demand is lower at 
| — 0 2 1 =  X2 — 0 .2. Other behavioral param eters concern the labor productivity  
rule in industry and the linear expenditure system. The Kaldor Verdoorn elasticity  
is, broadly in line with empirical evidence, set to  =  0.35. The energy intensity 
elasticity, following our discussion above, is set to  62 =  0.2. Engel elasticities of the  
linear expenditure system  depend on budget shares of the base year SAM d ata  and 
the assumed floor consumption of agricultural product. (Recall th at floor consumption  
of sector 1 and 3 output is zero.) We assume C / C ^  — 0 .2 , and Cp/C£ — 0 .6, so 
th at only one fifth of demand for ’’food” from VK-households is invariable to  changes 
in their real income, but three fifth from A-households.
[T a b le  3  a b o u t  h ere ]
To this baseline we add two further calibrations. Table 3 summarizes all of the  
relevant numbers. For each shock, the table shows three columns. The three columns 
report results for the three calibrations, shown at the bottom  of the table. The three  
calibrations become more ’’com plete” from (1) to (3). (3) is the baseline calibration. 
(1) sets labor productivity in industry as exogenous and makes trade in industry unre­
sponsive to price changes. (2) ’’turns on” the productivity rule, but m aintains trade as 
a fixed proportion of output. The top block of rows show key m acroeconom ic statistics, 
the bottom  block focuses on the decomposition of labor productivity growth into the  
energy related components, equation (2 .1 ), for industry and agriculture.
4.1 Investment shock
We can first consider the investment shock in more detail. In this scenario, real in­
vestm ent demand in in d u stry (/1 ) is increased by roughly six per cent— such th at the  
increase represents one percent of GDP. Table 3 summarizes the results. Let us begin 
at the top left, with calibration (1).
G D P grows at a bit more than two percent. Inflation runs at a bit less than two 
percent, and, accordingly, the real exchange rate  appreciates. The private balance 
(S  — / )  relative to G D P deteriorates by 0 .7  percentage points, for the obvious reason. 
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provides additional revenues. The foreign balance worsens (E  — M ) by 0.5 percentage 
points, because im ports are proportional to output, and increase with the expansion.7 
(E xp orts, on the other hand, are fully exogenous, since world demand does not change, 
and trade is inelastic to price changes.) We can think about these results along three 
dimensions: The demand expansion leads to labor transfer, inflation and energy inten­
sification. W e look at each in turn, and then move across to  column (2) and (3).
Structural change is set in motion; industry’s employment and output shares rise. 
Higher demand in industry leads to  growth of output in th at sector, and the accom ­
panying growth of labor demand. Labor demand can be satisfied at the conventional 
wage out of existing labor surplus in agriculture. Note th at aggregate labor produc­
tivity  grows at the rate  of real G D P growth, since we have assumed a constant overall 
labor supply. A gricultural labor productivity rises (approxim ately) at the rate  of labor 
transfer.
Second, inflation runs at 1.8 percent in column (1). However, it does not come from  
rising costs— wages— in industry. Inflation arises solely due to the supply constraint 
in the agricultural sector: Demand expansion in industry leads to  higher intermediate 
demand and higher incomes, which must trigger a price response to  balance supply 
and demand in agriculture. A spike of a bit more than five percent in this sector is 
sufficient to  lead to  overall inflation.8 Fundamentally, inflation is not conflict-driven, 
but commodity-driven.
Third, the energy use pattern  in industry does not change. Labor productivity  
growth in industry is zero, and so are its components, energy productivity growth 
ei and energy intensity growth £ ji . W ith  price-inelastic trade and exogenous labor 
productivity, output, GDP and employment grow at the same rate. As mentioned 
before, agricultural productivity growth increases with energy intensity growth, due to  
labor transfer.
How does the energy use pattern  change with endogenous productivity in industry? 
Column (2) shows th at £li is now positive. On the one hand, th at leads to slower 
labor transfer, roughly halving the productivity (and energy intensity, and the real 
wage) increase in agriculture. On the other hand, it is driven exclusively by energy 
intensity increases in industry, since with price-inelastic trade, fi\ — Y\ — X\ = 0 ,  and 
equation (2 .3) reduces to  equation (2 .4). Now, if we additionally make trade responsive 
to  relative price changes, energy productivity will rise, too. Column (3) shows a small 
increase in energy productivity, because real appreciation triggers a fall in im ports, 
which in turn implies th at fi\ — Y\ — X\ >  0.
Lastly, note th at the sign pattern  on the m acroeconom ic variables in the upper block 
is the same across all three columns. B u t magnitudes differ. Endogenous productiv-
7Private and public balance are reported as leakage less injection (S — I, T — G) and the foreign 
balance as injection less leakage (E — M) because we are accustomed to think in terms of the resulting 
signs.
8To save space, we do not show results for every single variable; sectoral output prices are part of 
those not reported. More detailed simulation results as well as other simulations are available from 
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ity growth in (2) and (3) limits inflation and with it real appreciation, but reduces 
labor transfer. Im portantly, GD P growth differs: The expansion is strongest in (1), 
because in addition to  the investment shock, ^-households experience strong real wage 
increases, and consume more. It is weakest in (2), because the consumption increase 
is m uted. This negative effect, in turn, is buffered in (3) by a real export increase in 
industry. W ith  endogenous productivity, Pi falls, the sector’s price competitiveness 
improves,9 and exports respond.
4.2 Wage and exchange rate shock
W age and exchange rate  shock are best considered together. Let us begin again with 
calibration (1). Nominal wage increase in industry is expansionary, and leads to  con­
siderable inflation, which in turn triggers real appreciation. Following the real income 
increase, private and public balance improve, as in both sectors savings rise. The  
foreign balance improves, because the term s of trade change favorably.
Nominal exchange depreciation, on the other hand, is contractionary. Contrac­
tionary devaluations are especially relevant in developing countries, where interme­
diate and capital goods im ports can be relatively price inelastic, and where the real 
wage reduction from depreciation cuts heavily into consumption. K rugm an and Taylor 
(1978) argued the possibility a while ago, Storm  (1997) and Razm i (2007) present more 
recent discussions. Here, column (1) of the exchange rate  simulation shows a strong  
G D P contraction, strong real depreciation, and deflation. Following the real income 
fall, private and public balance worsen. The foreign balances deteriorates, by about 
one and a half percentage points of GDP.
As above, we can dig deeper along three dimensions— labor transfer, inflation, and 
energy use changes— and subsequently move across the other two calibrations. F irst, 
the consum ption-driven expansion following the wage shock leads to  labor transfer 
from agriculture to  industry, and the accom panying agricultural real wage rise. The  
trade induced contraction following the exchange depreciation, on the other hand, 
leads to (reverse) labor transfer from industry to agriculture, and a steep real wage fall 
for ^-households.
Second, the wage-led expansion triggers (com m odity-)inflation as above; but the  
exchange-led contraction triggers deflation. The former adds to the assumed wage 
inflation in industry, the latter dominates the aggregate inflation measure— for negative 
3.4  percent— in the exchange rate  case. We can again stress the im portance of the  
agricultural supply constraint for these results. Com m odity prices are strongly pro­
cyclical, as they swing with overall demand against the supply constraint. Real incomes 
in agriculture, furtherm ore, change with transfer of labor to industry.
Third, the wage change has no effect on labor productivity and its components in 
industry, but the exchange depreciation raises the im port bill and triggers a fall in /ii: 
Energy productivity falls. (It is here where the specific form of equation (3 .4) becomes
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im portant, ji must denote the real G D P -to -o u tp u t ratio, but it cannot come from the  
accounting relationship, and it must entail at least the nominal exchange rate— since 
otherwise the nominal exchange rate  would have no effect under price inelastic trade.) 
W ith  given labor productivity growth — 0, energy intensity growth must m atch  
th at with the opposite sign. G D P and employment expand or contract at the same 
pace, and the changing G D P -to -o u tp u t ratio  drives and £ ji .
Now, using calibration (2) brings about some changes. Calibration (2) features en­
dogenous productivity. In the wage scenario, positive productivity growth in industry  
limits labor transfer and with th at weakens the expansion. Still, energy productivity  
growth is zero, because there is no trade effect on the G D P -to -o u tp u t ratio. In the  
exchange rate  scenario, the consum ption-driven contraction in industry leads to  neg­
ative labor productivity growth. In this case, the trade-induced energy productivity  
loss is balanced in part by reverse labor transfer, and in part by an increase in energy 
intensity.
Lastly, as trade is ” turned on” with calibration (3), and im port and export price 
elasticities are sufficiently large,10 sign patterns switch: The wage increase is now 
contractionary, and the exchange depreciation expansionary.
Since trade elasticities have a com paratively large im pact on outcomes, the next 
section takes up sensitivity analysis.
4.3 Sensitity analysis and summary
W hich of the three sets of key param eters is ”b etter” ? W e don’t know. We have 
not done the econom etrics, and do not want to argue in favor of any. W e want to  
emphasize th at with a given technology, increases in labor productivity must be driven 
overwhelmingly by increases in energy intensity.
Figure 8 and 9 underline this point. Figure 8 has four panels. For all, the horizontal 
axis shows the trade price elasticities in industry from zero to  one. The label of each 
panel indicates the variable on the vertical axis, and the shock applied to the model. As 
such, each panel indicates the variability of a relevant variable to a changing param eter, 
given the shock. W hen drawn randomly, these experim ents are often called Monte 
Carlo. Here, we simply increase the trade elasticities from zero to 1 in small steps, and 
each tim e subject the model to— Panel (a )— the exchange rate  shock.
The result is clear, and unsurprising: There is a threshold beyond which a nominal 
depreciation becomes expansionary. Panel (b) complements this. Here, we consider the  
investment shock, which induces an output price fall in industry due to  the increase 
in labor productivity. The higher is the trade elasticity, the more can the economy 
benefit. The bottom  two panels illustrate the labor productivity growth decomposi­
tion. Energy productivity growth is zero, if trade is unresponsive to  price changes; 
and increases, the stronger trade responds to price changes. Energy intensity growth,
10As mentioned, both import and export price elasticities are calibrated to 0.75 in industry, and 
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however, makes up the bulk of labor productivity growth, and varies fairly little with 
a changing elasticity.11
Since our augmented K aldor-V erdoorn rule includes energy intensity as an argu­
m ent, we add Figure 9. Figure 9 summarizes sensitivity of key variables to changes 
in the energy intensity elasticity S2 in equation (2 .2 ). We vary S2 from zero to 0.3. 
Panel (a) and (b) indicate th at a higher energy intensity elasticity will strengthen the  
expansion following a depreciation and a demand shock. Since we use here the trade  
elasticities of the baseline calibration (3), a higher S2 simply exacerbates the price fall 
in industry, and with th at boosts external gains. In line with the fact th at these are 
secondary effects, the im pact is not too large.
The bottom  two panels again show the labor productivity growth decomposition. 
Energy productivity growth is as well driven by the trade effect. The higher the  
intensity elasticity, the stronger is labor productivity growth, the more pronounced are 
relative price changes and substitution away from im ports— which drive up jii. and 
accordingly e. Lastly, on the right, energy intensity feeds back positively into itself. 
A higher elasticity drives up ^ i ,  which reduces L i and, in consequence, increases 
energy intensity. The ” intercept” represents energy intensity resulting from traditional 
K aldor-V erdoorn effects.
Crucially, as above, across all different calibrations, labor productivity growth stems 
overwhelmingly from energy intensity growth. Energy productivity growth, in turn, is 
not driven by changes in, well, ’’the way things are done,” but by trade effects. Such 
trade effects can certainly last over the medium run, but are small, and arguably not 
a sustainable source of labor productivity growth.
In summary, the m odel’s behavior can be explained along the lines of (1) labor 
transfer, (2) the agricultural supply constraint and resulting inflationary tendencies, 
and (3) the labor productivity growth decomposition. Certainly, we have not build 
a model with technological upgrading, or the possibility of green energy production. 
B ut, many developing countries do not have the relevant capabilities— making the case 
presented here the relevant one for m ultilateral negotations on emissions reductions. 
Below, we close with a note on th at issue.
5  C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper presents a fairly standard model of a developing economy augmented by an 
energy providing sector. We analyze the links between industrialization, the agricul­
tural supply constraint and energy use. The discussion focuses on the fact th at labor 
productivity growth must stem  from either increases in energy productivity or energy 
intensity. Results show th at, across a number of different param eterizations, aggregate 
labor productivity growth is driven by increased use of energy.
11 Energy intensity increases with a higher trade elasticity, because higher output due to higher 
net export leads to higher labor productivity—which in turn reduces labor requirements in industry, 
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The result is implicit in the m odel’s setup, as it ultim ately rests on the fixed coeffi­
cient input-output m atrix. If our model— with fixed proportions technology, dem and- 
driven output in industry and a supply constraint in agriculture— is a reasonable ap­
proxim ation to  structural conditions in a developing economy such as Egypt, we have 
to conclude th at fossil emissions reduction costs growth.
To reduce fossil emissions and grow, the energy input coefficient needs to be low­
ered, i.e. through adoption of energy efficient production methods or provision of green 
energy. If resources are available, either strategy can be pursued. In the Global South, 
however, where resource mobilization is an ongoing concern, th at might be difficult. 
According to  a recent UN report (UN (2009), p.VIIff), greening of growth in devel­
oping countries is possible, but a ’’combination of large-scale investments and active 
policy interventions requires strong and sustained political com m itm ent embodied by a 
developmental state  and, as critically, sizeable and effective m ultilateral support with 
respect to both finance and technology.”
A Appendix: SAM
In this brief appendix we provide some more detail on the SAM.
D raw b acks: First, it is relatively old. Second, it does not disaggregate services and 
industry. Third, it does not account for informal activities. However, given the focus of this 
paper— a theoretical investigation of stylized links between energy use, supply constraints 
and development— we hope that these are acceptable.
A g g reg atio n  of households: We aggregate the ten households of the SAM in El-Said 
et al. (2001) into three using the source of income as a criterion. Agricultural households, 
for example, receive income from all factors of production— labor, capital and land— from 
agricultural and husbandry activities. In sectors 1 and 2, we distinguish between labor 
and capital incomes and assume wage-earning and profit-earning households. Wage-earning 
households do receive transfers of profits from businesses. For simplicitly, we abstract from 
these; meaning that part of profit income is suppressed in the SAM. Wage-earning households 
receive wage income from both industry and energy; profit earning households receive profit 
income from both industry and energy.
A g g reg atio n  o f co n su m p tion : To allocate consumption of the three goods to the three 
households, we apply household income shares in total income to the aggregate consumption 
demand for the product.
M u ltip lier m a tr ix : Table 2 provides the output multiplier matrix. It allows in-depth 
analysis of forward and backward linkages of final demand changes in a fixed-price model with 
demand determined output. Since output of the agricultural sector is fixed in our model, this 
matrix does not apply to it. Nevertheless, the matrix provides information on the demand 
structure of the economy, so that we include it here for the sake of completeness. Industry has 
the largest impact on the economy through its overall multiplier of 1.65. The relevant figures 
for agriculture and energy are 1.42 and 1.30. As expected, own-multipliers— the diagonal 
elements of the matrix— are larger than one. Off-diagonal coefficients measure the strength 
of backward production linkages among the three sectors. Both agriculture and energy sector 
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At the same time, a relatively strong backward linkage exists between sector 1 and 2. Energy, 
on the other hand, does not benefit much from a rise in final demand in either of the other 
two sectors.
B  A p p e n d i x :  C o n s u m p t i o n  e q u a t i o n s
For the sake of completeness, we list the equations of the Linear Expenditure (LES) system 
here. Recall that only wage earners consume; we discuss profit income in a moment. W -  
household’s disposable income is =  (1 — 7Ti)(l — )P\Y\ +  (1 — 7T3)(1 — )PsY:3, where 
TTj =  1 — for i =  1,3 is the sectoral capital share, and is the (net) tax rate on 
sectoral wage income, ^-households demand all three goods, and consume a minimum 
’’floor” amount of agricultural product, Cp'. We list the equations here for completeness.
~y W
C f  =  cY d p *  F (B.l)
v W  _  p  r ^ W
C W  =  CW  d _ 2  F  ( B 2 )
C f  =  (cf +  c f  )Cjf +  (1 - c f  - c f ) ^ L .  (B.3)
■*2
Analogously, A-households disposable income is Y^  =  (1 — tA)P^Y^) and their floor con­
sumption of agricultural product is Cp\
Ct  =  c ( B . 4 )
C£ =  c?C£ + (l-cf)YdA. (B.5)
Profit recipients, the C-households, do not consume. Their income is Y c =  7Ti.PiYi+713.P3Y3, 
and their savings—the sole source of private savings— is equal to a constant fraction sn of 
Y c . Profit income is taxed at the rates and t? in the two sectors, respectively.
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Tables a n d  Figures
i
1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2008
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Figure 1: Sectoral contributions to aggregate Figure 2: Sectoral output shares, Egypt 1970 - 2008.
output growth, Egypt 1970 - 2008. Source: UN Source: UN SNA and author's calculation.
SNA and author's calculation.
Figure 3: Sectoral employment shares, Egypt 1989 - Figure 4: Sectoral productivity leves, Egypt 1989 - 
2006. Source: ILO Global Employment Trends (GET) 2006. Source: ILO Global Employment Trends (GET)
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Figure 5: Growth rates of labor productivity and energy intensity. Sources: Energy: UN Energy Statistics Yearbook; 
GDP: UN SNA; employment: Groningen Growth and Development Center.
Energy productivity growth
-15% -10% -5% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20%
Figure 6: Growth rates of labor productivity and energy productivity. Sources: Energy: UN Energy Statistics 
Yearbook; GDP: UN SNA; employment: Groningen Growth and Development Center.
Figure 7: Growth rates of energy intensity and energy productivity. Sources: Energy: UN Energy Statistics Yearbook; 
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Costs
1 2 3
C o n su m p tio n  
W  C A
Gov Foreign Inv Sum
1 In d u s try 131.6 9.2 5.6 117.4 40.2 29.6 54.9 45.2 434
2 A g ric u ltu re 25.7 11.3 0.0 23.7 8.1 69
3 Energy 12.1 0.1 0.4 3.4 13.1 29
W ages 154.0 51.7 1.8 207
P ro fits 42.2 15.6 58
G o ve rn m e n t 17.7 -9.4 0.0 11.2 11.4 3.4 34
Foreign 50.5 5.9 5.7 62
Flows o f  fun ds 46.3 4.7 -5.9 -45.2 0
Sum 434 69 29 156 58 52 34 62 0
Table 1: Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for Egypt 1996/1997. See Section 3 and Appendix A for discussion.
1 2 3
1 In d u s try 1.49 0.21 0.26
2 A g ric u ltu re 0.11 1.21 0.02
3 Energy 0.04 0.01 1.02
M u lt ip lie r 1.65 1.42 1.30
Table 2: Multiplier matrix. See appendix B for discussion.
Demand W age Exchange rate
10% real in ve s tm e n t 10% n o m in a l w age 10% no m in a l
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Macroeconomic statistics
Real GDP g ro w th 2.2 1.8 2.0 3.3 2.8 -2.1 -5.8 -5.2 1.1
In fla tio n 1.8 0.5 0.5 12.6 10.5 9.3 -3.4 -0.9 0.4
Real exchange ra te -1.7 -0.5 -0.5 -11.2 -9.5 -8.5 13.9 11.0 9.6
P riva te  ba lance (A in % pts o f  GDP) -0.67 -0.72 -0.69 0.36 0.31 -0.39 -1.03 -0.92 0.12
Public ba lance (A in % p ts  o f  GDP) 0.17 0.15 0.16 0.24 0.21 -0.14 -0.48 -0.41 0.11
External ba lance (A in % pts o f  GDP) -0.50 -0.57 -0.53 0.61 0.52 -0.52 -1.51 -1.32 0.24
E m p lo ym e n t share o f  in d u s try  (A in % pts) 2.1 1.0 1.1 3.1 1.5 -1.5 -5.2 -3.1 0.7
O u tp u t share o f  in d u s try  (A in % pts) 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.5 -0.6 -1.0 -0.8 0.6
Productivity & Energy
Industry & services
Labor p ro d u c t iv ity  g ro w th 0.0 1.0 1.1 0.0 1.5 -0.9 0.0 -2.1 1.0
Energy p ro d u c t iv ity  g ro w th 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 -1.5 -2.6 -2.6 -0.6
Energy in te n s ity  g ro w th 0.0 1.0 1.1 0.0 1.5 0.7 2.6 0.5 1.5
Agriculture
Labor p ro d u c t iv ity  g ro w th 9.3 4.2 4.7 14.5 6.3 -5.7 -18.4 -12.2 1.6
Energy p ro d u c t iv ity  g ro w th 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1
Energy in te n s ity  g ro w th 9.3 4.2 4.7 14.5 6.3 -5.7 -17.5 -11.2 2.8
Key parameters
T rade p rice  e la s tic itie s  in  in d u s try 0 0 0.75
K a ld o r-V e rd o o rn  e la s tic ity 0 0.35 0.35
Energy in te n s ity  e la s t ic ity 0 0.20 0.20
Table 3: Simulation results. This table summarizes model results in response to three different shocks—a demand, 
a wage and an exchange rate shock—with three different sets of key parameter values each; (1), (2) and (3). All 
three concern industry. Calibration (1) "turns off" trade price responsiveness and labor productivity in industry; (2) 
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(a) Real GDP growth: Exchange rate shock (b) Real GDP growth: Demand shock
(c) Energy productivity growth: Demand shock
0.25 0.5 0.75
(d ) Energy intensity growth: Demand shock
Figure 8: Sensitivity of model results to varying trade price elasticity (cp1 = Xi) in industry. Shocks are as in Table 3. 
Horizontal axes in all four panels show varying 4*vXi f°r the interval [0,1]; vertical axes growth rates in 
percentage points. As an example, consider Panel (a): The higher the trade elasticity, the higher is real GDP growth 


















(c) Energy productivity growth: Demand shock
0.1 0.2 0.3
(c) Energy intensity growth: Demand shock
1-4
1.3
Figure 9: Sensitivity of model results to varying energy intensity elasticity S2 in industry. Shocks are as in Table 3. 
Horizontal axes in all four panels show varying 82 for the interval [0,0.3]; vertical axes growth rates in percentage 
points. As an example, consider Panel (c): The higher S2, the higher is <fy in response to a demand shock.
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